

# All You Ever Wanted to Know About Dynamic Taint Analysis & Forward Symbolic Execution (but might have been afraid to ask)

(Yes, we were trying to overflow the title length field on the submission server)

Edward J. Schwartz, **Thanassis Avgerinos**, David Brumley

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

1

# A **Few Things** You Need to Know About Dynamic Taint Analysis & Forward Symbolic Execution (but might have been afraid to ask)

Edward J. Schwartz, **Thanassis Avgerinos**, David Brumley


5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

2

## The Root of All Evil

Humans write programs




This Talk:  
Computers Analyzing Programs Dynamically at Runtime

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

3

## Two Essential Runtime Analyses



5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

4

## Our Contributions

Computers Analyzing Programs Dynamically at Runtime

Dynamic Taint Analysis:  
Is this value affected by user input?

Forward Symbolic Execution:  
What input will make execution reach *this* line of code?

- 1: Turn English descriptions into an **algorithm**
  - Operational Semantics
- 2: Algorithm highlights caveats, issues, and unsolved problems that are deceptively hard

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

5

## Our Contributions (cont'd)

- 3: Systematize recurring themes in a wealth of previous work



5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

6

**Dynamic Taint Analysis:**  
What values are derived from user input?

1. How it works – example
2. Desired properties
3. Example issue. Paper has many more.

5/19/2010 Carnegie Mellon University 7

● tainted ● untainted

→ `x = get_input( )`  
`y = x + 42`  
`...`  
`goto y`

Input is tainted

$\Delta$	
Var	Val
x	7

Taint Introduction

$\tau$	
Var	Tainted?
x	T

Input  $\frac{t = \text{IsUntrusted}(src)}{\text{get\_input}(src) \downarrow t}$

5/19/2010 Carnegie Mellon University 8

● tainted ● untainted

→ `x = get_input( )`  
`y = x + 42`  
`...`  
`goto y`

Data derived from user input is tainted

$\Delta$	
Var	Val
x	7
y	49

Taint Propagation

$\tau$	
Var	Tainted?
x	T
y	T

BinOp  $\frac{t_1 = \tau[x_1], t_2 = \tau[x_2]}{x_1 + x_2 \downarrow t_1 \vee t_2}$

5/19/2010 Carnegie Mellon University 9

● tainted ● untainted

→ `x = get_input( )`  
`y = x + 42`  
`...`  
`goto y`

Policy Violation Detected

$\Delta$	
Var	Val
x	7
y	49

Taint Checking

$\tau$	
Var	Tainted?
x	T
y	T

$P_{\text{goto}}(t_a) = \neg t_a$   
(Must be true to execute)

5/19/2010 Carnegie Mellon University 10

Real Use: Exploit Detection

`x = get_input( )`  
`y = ...`  
`...`  
`goto y`

Jumping to overwritten return address

```
... strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
... return;
```

5/19/2010 Carnegie Mellon University 11

**Memory Load**

Variables	
$\Delta$	
Var	Val
x	7

Memory	
$\mu$	
Addr	Val
7	42

$\tau$	
Var	Tainted?
x	T

$\tau_\mu$	
Addr	Tainted?
7	F

5/19/2010 Carnegie Mellon University 12

### Problem: Memory Addresses

```

x = get_input(0)
y = load(x)
...
goto y
    
```

All values derived from user input are tainted??

$\Delta$	Var	Val
	x	7
$\mu$	Addr	Val
	7	42
$\tau_\mu$	Addr	Tainted?
	7	F

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

13

### Policy 1: Taint depends only on the memory cell

```

x = get_input(0)
y = load(x)
...
goto y
    
```

$\Delta$	Var	Val
	x	7
$\mu$	Addr	Val
	7	42
$\tau_\mu$	Addr	Tainted?
	7	F

**Undertainting**  
Failing to identify tainted values - e.g., missing exploits

Taint Propagation

$$\text{Load } v = \Delta[x], t = \tau_\mu[V] \rightarrow \text{load}(x) \downarrow t$$

$\tau_\mu$	Addr	Tainted?
	7	F

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

14

### Policy 2: If either the address or the memory cell is tainted, then the value is tainted

```

x = get_input(0)
y = load(x)
...
goto y
    
```

**Overtainting**  
Unaffected values are tainted - e.g., exploits on safe inputs

Memory
Address expression is tainted
printa
printb

Taint Propagation


$$\text{Load } v = \Delta[x], t = \tau_\mu[V], t_a = \tau[x] \rightarrow \text{load}(x) \downarrow t \vee t_a$$

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

15

### Research Challenge State-of-the-Art is not perfect for all programs



5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

16

Forward Symbolic Execution:  
What input will make execution reach *this* line of code?

- How it works – example
- Inherent problems of symbolic execution
- Proposed solutions

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

17

### The Challenge



```

bad_abs(x is input)
if (x < 0) then
    return -x
if (x = 0x12345678) then
    return -x
return x
    
```


Forward Symbolic Execution:  
What input will make execution reach *this* line of code?

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

18

## A Simple Example




5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

19

## One Problem: Exponential Blowup Due to Branches




Exponential Number of Interpreters/formulas in # of branches

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

20

## Path Selection Heuristics



- Depth-First Search (bounded), Random Search [Cadar2008]
- Concolic Testing [Sen2005, Godefroid2008]

5/19/2010


Carnegie Mellon University

21

## Symbolic Execution is *not* Easy

- Exponential number of interpreters/formulas

branching



- Exponentially-sized formulas

substitution




- Solving a formula is NP-Complete!

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

22

## Other Important Issues



5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

23

## Conclusion

- Dynamic taint analysis and forward symbolic execution used extensively in literature
  - Formal algorithm and what is done for each possible step of execution often not emphasized
- We provided a formal definition and summarized
  - Critical issues
  - State-of-the-art solutions
  - Common tradeoffs

5/19/2010

Carnegie Mellon University

24

**Thank You!**  
thanassis@cmu.edu

**Questions?**